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GERMAN HISTORIANS AND MACEDONIAN IMPERIALISM¹

IN this paper I shall limit my inquiry to a vicennium of Greek History, from 358 to 338 B.C., the critical period of Macedonian expansion under Philip II. to the hurt of the Athens of Demosthenes's day. My study is intended to probe the spirit and degree of historical accuracy which historians of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany have reflected in their treatment of the period under consideration. I shall endeavor to indicate, after the method of literary criticism which Sainte-Beuve first popularized, whatever of political, social, or intellectual influences may have guided the writer in the selection and exposition of his historical data. For Eduard Meyer warns us in his *Methodology* that "the time in which the historian lives is a factor which cannot be eliminated from any historical exposition; this is true as well of his individuality as of the opinions and beliefs of his time."²

A case in point is that of B. G. Niebuhr, first of German critical historians. Living through the Storm and Stress period of the French Revolution, and officially embattled in the War of Liberation against Napoleon, he had grown to be an ardent champion of liberty, whether of the individual, of the nation, or of the state. Conversely, he became possessed of bitterest hatred for the Bonapartist system—its inhumanity, its oppression of nationalities, and its militaristic imperialism. In 1805, the year of Ulm and Austerlitz, he translated into German the First Philippic of Demosthenes, drew therein a parallel between the historic rôles of Napoleon and Philip of Macedon, and dedicated the publication to Czar Alexander I. of Russia, the President Wilson of his belligerent and post-bellum age. His views concerning Philip and Demosthenes he subsequently elaborated in a course of lectures on ancient history which he delivered at the University of Bonn during the years 1825–1826 and 1829–1830.

Of these lectures an English contemporary of ours, G. P.

¹ This paper was read at the Cleveland meeting of the American Historical Association, December 31, 1919.

² "Zur Theorie und Methodik der Geschichte", in *Kleine Schriften zur Geschichtstheorie und zur Wirtschaftlichen und Politischen Geschichte des Altertums* (Halle a. S., 1910), p. 54.

Gooch,³ has written: "no part is more suffused with his own personality than that in which he relates the collapse of Greece before the might of Macedon." Niebuhr, I take it, was in hearty sympathy with the dictum of Saint Augustine: "Remota justitia, quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia." Assuredly, the formation of the Macedonian state by Philip never met with his approval, for its object had inclined from the very beginning toward the subjugation of Greece, its means had been of the basest—faithless, virtueless, conscienceless.⁴ Philip's honesty in the making and observance of treaties he impugned, his disregard for national self-determination he denounced, and his morals he branded as in the superlative degree detestable.⁵ Niebuhr's praise of Demosthenes, however, was in inverse proportion to his censoriousness toward Philip. The tragic nature of his noble struggle, his indomitable fortitude in times of adversity, the laudable and patriotic quality of his statesmanship, alike win the historian's enthusiastic admiration.⁶ But toward the opponents of Demosthenes he was less charitable. Traitorous conduct on the part of Aeschines he deemed probable, and judged the claim of the latter's orations to equal merit with those of the former to be as reprehensible as the assumption that the chirp of the cricket is comparable to the song of the nightingale.⁷ Again, of Isocrates his judgment is most severe. "An extremely poor, forlorn writer", he characterizes him, "one of the most thoughtless and wretched of souls; the patriarch of all sophists and declaimers".⁸

But while Niebuhr was lecturing at Bonn, a younger generation of Germans, less reminiscent of the past and more concerned with the German nation of the future, sat spellbound at the feet of a master of dialectic and metaphysical abstractions, Professor Hegel of the University of Berlin. Hegel's political speculations were designed to effect German unification on the basis of a common culture, Prussian military power, and the existing monarchic and ecclesiastical order. From the *Philosophy of His-*

³ *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1913), p. 22.

⁴ B. G. Niebuhr, *Vorträge über alte Geschichte*, herausgegeben von Marcus Niebuhr (Berlin, 1847-1851), translated by L. Schmitz under title, *Lectures on Ancient History from the Earliest Times to the Taking of Alexandria by Octavianus* (Philadelphia, 1852), II. 308-309.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 308-309, 348.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 324-327.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 325, 331.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 234, 386.

tory⁹ and the *Philosophy of Right*¹⁰ one gathers that he regarded world history as the progressive revelation of reason, which may be called the *Weltgeist*¹¹—or, to paraphrase Metternich, “l’esprit qui sert à tout et ne mène à rien.” This *Weltgeist*, he taught, revealed itself as the progressive consciousness of freedom, which he defined as the product of private and public morality (*Moralität und Sittlichkeit*).¹² This freedom he identified with the state, whose existence constitutes the highest right (*Recht*), and whose essence enjoins upon its members obedience to its laws and customs as their highest duty.¹³ The world mission of such a state, envisaged inwardly as civil power and outwardly as military power, can be managed best by an hereditary monarch, whose public actions are not to be measured by the accustomed standards of private morality.¹⁴ This monarch, aided by a warrior caste, which Hegel calls the “class of universality”, may on occasion become the exalted agent of the *Weltgeist*, an Alexander, a Caesar, or a Napoleon, and may compound the elements of decadence, which a protracted period of peace is apt to develop, in the purifying crucible of war.¹⁵

Such, in barest outline, was the political philosophy and philosophic history of Hegel. His lectures during the years 1826 to 1829 were attended by a young and impressionable student of philology, patriot and Prussian to the core, J. G. Droysen.¹⁶ From Hegel Droysen acquired, as Lord Acton observed in his article on German Schools of History, that habit of abstract thought which he applied in the first of his historical works, the *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*.¹⁷ The book seems to have been written under the urge of the current Prussian impulse of nationalism: the relations between the military monarchy of

⁹ *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, herausgegeben von Ed. Gans, in *Hegels Werke*, Band IX. (Berlin, 1837).

¹⁰ *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*, herausgegeben von Ed. Gans, in *Hegels Werke*, Band VIII. (Berlin, 1833).

¹¹ *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, pp. 12–14.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 22; *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, p. 68.

¹³ *Grundlinien*, pp. 69, 313; and cf. *Vorlesungen*, pp. 40–42.

¹⁴ *Grundlinien*, pp. 350–351, 372–375; and *Vorlesungen*, pp. 33–36.

¹⁵ *Grundlinien*, pp. 421–422, 418–420; *Vorlesungen*, pp. 31–32. Cf. the added reference to Alexander and Napoleon in the translation by J. Sibree from the third edition of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (London, 1890), p. 32.

¹⁶ Cf. O. Hintze, s.v. “J. G. Droysen”, in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, LXXXIV. (1904) 85–86.

¹⁷ Hamburg, 1833.

Macedon and the pernicious Hellenic particularism of the past were to teach by precept and example the need for Prussian hegemony over the small, rival German states of his own day.¹⁸

The very title of Droysen's work, intended, as he tells us, not as a biography but as the history of a great man whose "personality was only the instrument of his deeds, his deeds only the impulsion of century-long influences", bears the impress of Hegelian speculation. The book was written with the conviction that *Nous* had been the guide of Clio for all time, that the rational course of history had been advanced by Alexander, the apostle of the *Weltgeist*, and that the achievements of Philip of Macedon were a salutary and necessary preparation for the world mission of his more famous son. The result was a remarkable panegyric from the pen of Droysen on Philip and things Macedonian in general, and a scathing condemnation of Hellenic politics and Demosthenic *intransigence*. Philip, to follow Droysen, was a typical product of the sophistic educational methods of his time, combining Greek with Macedonian virtues and vices: faithlessness, joy of life, bonhomie, shewdness, deception, licentiousness, and criminality.¹⁹ His statesmanship, however, was beyond cavil. Out of his crude but vigorous Macedonians (racially Greeks, as proved by the Heraclid tradition of their kings) he made a nation of free, contented, and devoted masses and of unselfish, crown-serving, and culture-craving nobility, brought them all under the government of a "monarchy in the noblest sense of the word", and organized them in a truly national standing army, as an imperative measure of defense against the dangers which had beset him during the early years of his reign.²⁰ His object had never been the reduction of Greece to a state of subjection, but he had "begun and completed everything with the sole purpose of the war against Persia in view", a national task which summoned all Greeks "to the distant goal of their historical life", and one capable of being realized through the union of Greek freedom and independence with Macedonian monarchical sovereignty.²¹ With Isocrates, Droysen deprecated the constant warfare between the atom-like city-states of Greece, attributed it to the superabundance of energy confined within the land, and sought the remedy without, namely, in the war with Persia.²² Hellenic

¹⁸ Cf. Hintze, *loc. cit.*, p. 88.

¹⁹ Droysen, *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*, p. 45.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 36, 41-43.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16, 33, 37.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 16, 32.

freedom he regarded as a withered flower, Greek democracies he stigmatized for their ineffectiveness in accomplishing the "national task", and the immortal struggle of Athens against Macedonian Philip he judged "a conflict for impotent independence and for the tawdry finery of old-fashioned freedom".²³ Of Demosthenes he records that "history knows but few characters as lamentable as the great Athenian orator; he knew not his time, his people, his enemy, nor himself; his life, the irksome consequence of a fundamental mistake, produced no result other than that of making the victory of Macedon the more definitive and effective."²⁴

Although Droysen's interpretation of the clash between Philip and Demosthenes met with but short shrift at the hands of classical philologists like Arnold Schaefer²⁵ and Friedrich Blass,²⁶ his book and viewpoint retained, according to an admission of Beloch's in 1904,²⁷ a position of unrivalled esteem among historians of Germany from the thirties to the eighties of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, Droysen's attitude toward the rival claims of Athens and Macedon, colored by the unrealities of Hegelian speculation and Prussian aspiration, has been maintained in spirit, and, with amplifications through modern research, in substance by a majority of German historians from the eighties to the present day,²⁸ but colored in this case by the realities of 1864, 1866, 1870-1871, and by contemporary colonial and commercial imperialism.

The application of the political deductions to which the inexorable logic of these events gave rise in Germany, the world has witnessed and experienced to satiety during the eventful seven years now behind us. The gist of their content can be conveniently gleaned from the pages of Bismarck's *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, or, better still, from Heinrich von Treitschke's *Politik*, a work concerning which A. J. Balfour aptly said that it "bears somewhat the same relation to Bismarck as Machiavelli's *Prince* bears to Caesar Borgia". Grant Robertson, in a recent and highly com-

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 32.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁵ *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, second ed. (Leipzig, 1885-1887). The first edition appeared in 1856.

²⁶ *Die Attische Beredsamkeit von Gorgias bis zu Lysias*, first ed. (Leipzig, 1868-1880), second ed. (1887-1898).

²⁷ Cf. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, III. 2 (Strassburg, 1904), p. 14.

²⁸ See J. Kromayer, in *Historische Zeitschrift*, C. (1908) 38: Droysen, "ein Mann, auf dessen Schultern unsere Forschung noch immer steht". Cf. also Cauer, in *Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie*, XXVIII. (1911), col. 1169.

mendable study of Bismarck, has summarized these deductions as follows:²⁹

The unification of Germany, the establishment of a German hegemony on the Continent, the Central Europe, the armed peace imposed on and by Nationalism in arms, the defeat of Liberalism and of democratic self-government, the doctrine of the State as the representative and incarnation of Might and Force, the principle that policy is the expression of a national will for Power to which all methods are legitimate provided that they achieve their end at a minimum of cost, the gospel that war is an inevitable and necessary part of the struggle for existence, and that (in Moltke's famous words) the ideal of universal peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream, the principle that reason of State transcends the code of ethics, applicable in the social intercourse of individual with individual — all these and many other characteristics of the Bismarckian system and the Bismarckian interpretation of life and its values lie embedded in the period of history which Bismarck made his own for the Germany and the Europe in which he lived.

That considerations and political currents such as these affected the course of German historical scholarship has been admitted, even in Germany. In 1905 Theodor Lenschau of Berlin, writing for Bursian's *Jahresbericht*,³⁰ noted the tendency of Liberals like Grote to favor Athenian democracy in its opposition to Philip's oppressive absolutism, and observed with an evident sigh of relief that "a new generation of historians have grown up, individuals who were in their youth when Italy and Germany were forcibly united from the North, and who saw Bismarck at work—a man grown to maturity and fame by combating liberal ideas—and finally, individuals who . . . bore witness perforce to the steady decline of liberalism, which was opposed to the new idea of a national world-policy."

The writings of this new generation of historians I have undertaken to examine in so far as they deal with the period 358 to 338 B.C. My list, which I believe to be representative although not all-inclusive, comprises works of Julius Beloch, A. Holm, J. Kaerst, Eduard Meyer, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Pöhlmann, Kahrstedt, Kessler, Paul Wendland, C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, and E. Drerup. Of these authors all but Kaerst,³¹ Lehmann-Haupt,³²

²⁹ *Bismarck* (London, 1918), p. 488.

³⁰ "Die Altertumswissenschaft im letzten Vierteljahrhundert, Griechische Geschichte", *Bursians Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, CXXIV. (1905) 166–167.

³¹ *Geschichte des Hellenistischen Zeitalters*, Band I. (Leipzig, 1901).

³² "Griechische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Chaironeia," in Gercke und Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1912), III. 1–120.

and, with vacillations, Wilamowitz,³³ agree in defaming the classicist view of Demosthenes's democratic, historic rôle, and in extolling Macedonian statesmanship for consummating the political unification of Hellas. This interpretation, fairly conventional with living German historians, one can gauge best through an analysis of the writings of the respective individuals named above.

Julius Beloch, radical, rationalist, and iconoclast, seems to have been the Grand Instaurator of Macedonian reputations—and that too, despite his professed disdain for heroes and hero-worship.³⁴ In 1884 he published *Die Attische Politik seit Perikles*, a work in which he sang the praises of Philip and Isocrates and maligned the character and politics of Demosthenes.³⁵ These views he subsequently incorporated in the second volume of his *Griechische Geschichte*,³⁶ from which I shall quote: "A statesman greater than Philip of Macedon has never sat enthroned." He succeeded in purging the Greek nation of the curse of centuries, namely, disunion—a task impossible of achievement by purely moral agencies.³⁷ "Had the allies [the Athenians, Thebans, *et al.*] conquered at Chaeronea . . . the ills of disunion would have continued . . ., greater anarchy and confusion have resulted."³⁸ The transformation of Greek culture into world culture became possible only through the conquest of Asia, which Philip at the head of his Macedonian Greeks had prepared and Alexander had accomplished.³⁹ To Demosthenes Beloch's text devotes but little more space than to Isocrates. By reason of his "Lokalpatriotismus" and his republican pride Demosthenes, according to Beloch, objected to the thought of Macedonian supremacy, particularly after the Peace of Philocrates.⁴⁰ His aggressive actions after 346, rather than the deeds of Philip, who had observed the Treaty of Philocrates in most conscientious fashion, led directly to the disaster at Chaeronea.⁴¹ In 341, unfortunately, he even appealed to the Persian king for intervention against Philip—by that course

³³ Cf. *Reden und Vorträge* (Berlin, 1901); "Die Griechische Literatur und Sprache", in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, herausgegeben von P. Hinneberg, I. 8 (Leipzig, 1907); and "Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen und Römer", *ibid.*, II. 4, 1 (Berlin, 1910).

³⁴ Cf. Lenschau, in *Bursians Jahresbericht*, CXXIV. (1905), 189–190.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 167; cf. also Lehmann-Haupt, in Gercke und Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft*, III. 124.

³⁶ Strassburg, 1897.

³⁷ Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, II. 485, 576.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 577.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 577–578.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 514.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 485, n. 5, 546–547, 550.

"everyone could see what had become of Demosthenes's fine talk about liberty and independence".⁴² The key changes abruptly, however, when the theme is Isocrates. His *Philippus*, in which he urged Philip to lead a Greece united under his hegemony against Persia, Beloch declares "to have been read from one end to another of the Hellenic world".⁴³ It was in large measure due to Isocrates, who prepared the way just as the men of 1848 had done for German unity, that Philip succeeded in unifying Greece, and that Alexander was enabled to extend Greek civilization and pioneering effort to Asia.⁴⁴ Isocrates, after Chaeronea, probably wrote his Third Letter to Philip, in which he "blessed the day of his old age that had permitted him to see the dawn of the new day".⁴⁵

This narrative of Beloch's, Holm characterizes in his *Greek History* as a sober estimate of the facts.⁴⁶ Philip of Macedon he exonerates from Theopompus's charge of deficient morals; "judged by his actions [he] was a humane sovereign, with just that amount of craft which is necessary for a statesman who wishes to carry out a great policy with a small state."⁴⁷ He was rough only toward his uncivilized Macedonians, but considerate toward the culture-loving Greeks; a man of his word, and of no cruel disposition.⁴⁸ He and his Macedonians, who were not unlike the Germans of old, succeeded in conquering the Hellenes because they understood and utilized the great principle of nationality.⁴⁹ He was "drawn by the disunited Greeks into their quarrels, and invited by them to play a decisive part in purely Greek affairs"; indeed, Demosthenes seems to have been the individual who brought Philip into Greece.⁵⁰ This Demosthenes was great as an agitator, but not as a statesman because he was not straightforward.⁵¹ No reliance is to be placed in his assertions; he never understood the real character of Philip and always misrepresented him to the Athenians.⁵²

⁴² Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, II. 548.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 531-532.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 574.

⁴⁶ A. Holm, *Griechische Geschichte*, translated under title, *The History of Greece from its Commencement to the Close of the Independence of the Greek Nation*, III. (London, 1896) 220.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 285.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 205, 285-286.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 240, 278.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 243, 279.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 217, 277.

His policy amounted virtually to this: it continued the old exploitation of Greece by Persia.⁵³ In this respect the advice of Isocrates, who was foremost among high-minded men in Greece, was the better: to revive old aspirations and unite Greece by means of a war against Persia.⁵⁴

The over-statement and uncritical method of Holm are of course foreign to the finished scholarship of Eduard Meyer. But he too has his *parti-pris* in the clash between Philip and Demosthenes.⁵⁵ Meyer's views on the period in question are contained in his articles on Alexander the Great⁵⁶ and on Isocrates's Second Letter to Philip,⁵⁷ and in fugitive passages of the fifth volume of his *History of Antiquity*.⁵⁸ He refers to the enthusiasm of writers like Niebuhr and Grote for ancient Hellas and its protagonist, Demosthenes, and adds:⁵⁹

Our interpretation of Greek History has become a different one; the conviction has grown that the communities of Greece could never again advance through their own endeavors to an even tolerable condition of affairs, that they were certainly unable to resolve the great problems awaiting the Nation's solution, that, in particular, Athens's actual power and political organization were in crass contradiction of its aspirations, that therefore Demosthenes could never have attained to positive success.

The chief task of Philip's lifetime, Meyer continues, was to gain and maintain the mass of the Balkan Peninsula for Macedonia. "But to make this position in the North secure for all future time, and likewise to obtain for his kingdom the standing of a great culture-state, it was necessary for him as well to win supremacy over the southern extension of the Balkan Peninsula, Greece."⁶⁰ The Macedonian kingdom, formed by a migration of Greeks from

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

⁵⁵ Cf. Lehmann-Haupt, in Gercke und Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft*, III. 124: "Im Gegensatz zu A. Schaefer, der mit zu grosser Ausschliesslichkeit den Standpunkt des Demosthenes vertritt, wird dieser aufs nachdrücklichste verurteilt von J. Beloch und ebenso von Eduard Meyer. Beide legen einen übertriebenen Nachdruck auf seine Anwaltsqualität und wittern häufiger, als nottut, Schwindeleien und Verdrehungen. . ."

⁵⁶ "Alexander der Grosse und die Absolute Monarchie" (Vortrag auf der Hamburger Philologenversammlung am 5. Oktober, 1905 gehalten), *Kleine Schriften* (Halle a S., 1910), p. 285 ff.

⁵⁷ "Isokrates' Zweiter Brief an Philipp und Demosthenes' Zweite Philippika", in *Sitzungsberichte der Kgl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1909, pp. 758-779.

⁵⁸ *Geschichte des Altertums*, Band V., *Der Ausgang der Griechischen Geschichte* (Stuttgart, 1902).

⁵⁹ Ed. Meyer, "Alexander der Grosse," *Kleine Schriften*, p. 285.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

Thessaly, could justly claim the right to survive as a culture-state if it put an end to the "heillose Zerrissenheit" of the Greek world, and if, instead of tolerating a disgraceful condition of Greek dependence on the powerless Persian king, it resolutely hurled its might against the foreign foe.⁶¹ Athens, in seeking the aid of Persia against Philip after the Peace of Philocrates, was committing a shameful act against the national cause.⁶² Demosthenes was, of course, to blame for this turn of affairs; he was probably in the pay of Persia, as Aeschines charged, and became the agent of the Persian king in Greece.⁶³ In his campaign against Philip in 344 he and his party "never hesitated to misrepresent the facts, to employ without scruple every method of the sophist".⁶⁴ His public orations were not genuinely delivered public addresses, but merely political pamphlets such as those of Isocrates.⁶⁵ The latter became the "real political spokesman of the nation"; his writings gave evidence of an appreciation of the actual tasks of the nation, such as writers like Xenophon and Demosthenes were unable to envisage.⁶⁶ In 338, after Chaeronea, he penned his indubitably genuine Third Letter to Philip, in which he hailed the victory of the Macedonian king, "because it nourished his hope that he might live to see realized the national program of Greek unification and of the great Greek war of expansion against Persia".⁶⁷

Wilamowitz, however, mitigates Meyer's imperialistic strictures with some of the restraint of Blass, Schaefer, and Jebb. Although he condemns Athenian democracy of the fourth century rather vehemently, and quotes with approval the gloss written by Fred-eric the Great in the margin of his copy of Montesquieu's *Considérations*: "ces rois de Macédoine étaient ce qu'est un roi de Prusse . . . de nos jours", Wilamowitz, nevertheless, sounds this warning against pressing too closely the parallel between Prussians and Germans on the one hand, and between Macedonians and Greeks on the other hand: "the political and social life of the Macedonians had a basis so entirely different from that of the Greeks that Macedonia could never merge with Thebes and Athens to form a single state", and therefore "the resistance of Demos-thenic Athens was a genuine tragedy, because it had to be in vain

⁶¹ Ed. Meyer, "Alexander der Grosse", *Kleine Schriften*, pp. 289-292.

⁶² "Isokrates' Zweiter Brief an Philipp", *loc. cit.*, pp. 777-778.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 778, n. 2.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 778.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 770.

⁶⁶ *Geschichte des Altertums*, V. 280, 337.

⁶⁷ "Isokrates' Zweiter Brief an Philipp", *loc. cit.*, p. 766, n. 1.

and because it was waged against the eternal and unmerciful law of history—but it was a fight for a good cause, namely, the honor of the Fatherland.”⁶⁸ But with all that, Greece needed a master for its self-preservation, otherwise Greece as Ionia would have come under the domination of Persia.⁶⁹ Demosthenes, whose short-sighted fanaticism regarded Philip as nothing but a tyrant, and whose oratory together with that of his school has encompassed the decline of the Athenian state with such an aureole “that posterity has completely deranged the relative positions of Macedonia and Athens as to power and right”, is, notwithstanding, entitled to this meed of praise: “he believed in the greatness of Athens and of Democracy, and lived and died for his ideal”.⁷⁰ But of Isocrates Wilamowitz makes the criticism that he lacked breadth of political vision in continuously harping on the theme of the good old days of Solon; he was the master of the new muse, Rhetoric, which henceforth made its venal charms available for every powerful individual; his writings belong to the class of *genre ennuyeux*.⁷¹

Pöhlmann deals with our period in his *Outlines of Greek History*,⁷² which forms a part of Müller's *Handbuch*, and in a contribution to the Bavarian Academy's *Sitzungsberichte* for 1913 on Isocrates and the Problem of Democracy.⁷³ Pöhlmann, in general, shares the viewpoint of Eduard Meyer. He writes of the time of Philip: “the city-state had lost its right to exist”; “it had to yield to the policy of broad vistas, if the economic, moral, and intellectual forces which the nation still retained, were to serve in advancing civilization to a greater degree.”⁷⁴ Chaeronea decided the victory of the *Flächenstaat* over the *Polis*, the victory of monarchy over democracy.⁷⁵ Demosthenes's view of democracy was a doctrinaire and unhistorical one.⁷⁶ Isocrates judged more

⁶⁸ Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, “Basilea” (1886), in *Reden und Vorträge* (Berlin, 1901), pp. 72–74.

⁶⁹ *Id.*, *Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen*, p. 137.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 136–137; *id.*, *Die Griechische Literatur und Sprache*, pp. 72–73, 75.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 68–69; *Staat und Gesellschaft*, pp. 135, 137.

⁷² *Grundriss der Griechischen Geschichte nebst Quellenkunde* (Munich, 1909), in Müller's *Handbuch der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, III. 4.

⁷³ “Isokrates und das Problem der Demokratie”, *Sitzungsberichte der Kgl. Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, phil.-hist. Klasse, 1913, pp. 3–171.

⁷⁴ Pöhlmann, *Grundriss*, pp. 230–231.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 241. Cf. the entire passage, pp. 240–241: “Für Demosthenes und die demokratische Zeitanschauung überhaupt ist der demokratische Volks-

correctly in anticipating a favorable turn of the national fortune only by the aid of monarchy.⁷⁷ In fact, he is also an excellent authority to cite against the evils of democracy: his works yield abundant texts to be applied to the pernicious workings of American democracy with its party machines, its bosses, and its "Stimmvieh", of British politics, and of the impractical government planned by the Social-Democrats of Germany.⁷⁸

The writings of Kahrstedt and Kessler can be conveniently paired. They were novitiate performances:—the one, on the *Politics of Demosthenes*,⁷⁹ by a pupil of Eduard Meyer; the other, on *Isocrates and the Panhellenic Idea*,⁸⁰ by a pupil of E. Drerup. The thesis of Kahrstedt is an expansion of E. Meyer's conclusions on the baneful influence and activities of Persia in Greek and particularly in Athenian affairs. The reputation of Demosthenes Kahrstedt adorns with many of Bismarck's diplomatic wiles. He was a clever statesman, but his Olynthiacs demonstrate his lack of idealism and even of Hellenic patriotism.⁸¹ "I have attempted to prove", wrote Kahrstedt, "that Demosthenes worked for Persia; to establish this proof, I described the connection of political events and asked myself the question, who reaped the advantage from the proposals which Demosthenes offered in every particular situation. . . . The answer was ever the same, namely, Persia."⁸² The many orations of Demosthenes, especially that on the Naval Boards, the Megalopolitan, the Aristocratea, the Rhodian, the Olynthiacs, and the Philippics, betray the same zeal for Persian power, at times even to the exclusion of Athenian interests.⁸³ On

staat der Rechtsstaat κατ' ἐξοχήν, der einzige wahre Staat, weil in der Demokratie allein das Gesetz herrsche oder herrschen solle. In allen anderen Staaten ist der persönliche Wille eines oder weniger Individuen stärker als das Gesetz, mag es nun . . . die Oligarchie sein oder die Monarchie. . . . Dass diese Grundanschauung der Demokratie und ihres grossen Führers eine doktrinaire und ungeschichtliche war, wer wollte dies verkennen?"

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

⁷⁸ *Id.*, "Isokrates und das Problem der Demokratie", *loc. cit.*, pp. 9, 10, 13, n. 1, 41, 42, 86, 138-140, 159, 162, n. 1. On Athenian and present-day democracy Pöhlmann (*ibid.*, pp. 38-39) writes: "Als ob nicht gerade diese Demokratie . . . dadurch dass sie Politik und Rechtsprechung zu Massenaktionen macht, die schlimmsten Instinkte in der Menschenbrust entfesselte!"

⁷⁹ U. Kahrstedt, "Die Politik des Demosthenes", *Forschungen zur Geschichte des ausgehenden Fünften und des Vierten Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1910), pp. 1-154.

⁸⁰ J. Kessler, *Isokrates und die Panhellenische Idee*, (Paderborn, 1911).

⁸¹ Kahrstedt, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-126, 128.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 98, 102-103, 111-112, 114-115, 122, 125-126, 140-141.

Kahrstedt's view of the relations between Demosthenes and the Persian king, G. Glotz coined the epigram: "Démosthènes n'est pas devenu partisan d'Artaxerxès par haine de Philippe, mais ennemi de Philippe par amour pour Artaxerxès."⁸⁴

Kessler reveals Isocrates to us as an able thinker and far-seeing *Realpolitiker*, whose activities as publicist were consistently devoted to the task of propagandizing the Panhellenic idea for the national unification which Greece so sorely needed.⁸⁵ This idea, often contrary to accepted opinion and to the literal interpretation of frequent passages, can, by a procedure not unlike the tropological and allegorizing methods of medieval theologians, be laid bare in Isocrates's important orations, the Panegyricus, On the Peace, the Philippus, and the Panathenaicus.⁸⁶

Paul Wendland, needless to say, uncovers but few of the "howlers" of Kahrstedt and Kessler. He has contributed two scholarly articles to the *Göttingen Nachrichten* for 1910; the first on King Philip and Isocrates,⁸⁷ the second on Isocrates and Demosthenes.⁸⁸ In 1913 he summarized and popularized his investigations for the history-reading public of *Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*.⁸⁹ He wrote therein:

It is now common knowledge how Philip consolidated his state, kept his dangerous northern neighbors in their proper territorial limits, created a citizen army of his people and an officers' corps of the nobility. . . . The temperate and careful nature of Philip's dealings with the Athenian Demos shows that he pursued no ruthless policy of aggrandizement. He fought for the necessary establishment and preservation of his state, for the essential interests of his nation. . . . This clash [between Athens and Macedon] of just interests serves admirably the purpose of training one in political thinking, helps to guard one against the influence of trivial talk about morality and politics, and makes one realize that such a conflict cannot be settled by international arbitration. It should be pointed out that Demosthenes was actuated in his condemnation of the enemy by motives of patriotic hate. Furthermore, one should strongly emphasize the superior merits of a thorough system of monarchical government and of military discipline.⁹⁰

⁸⁴ Cf. *Revue Historique*, CVIII. (1911) 108.

⁸⁵ Kessler, *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 80.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 20, 27-28, 47, 52, 57, 66-67, 70.

⁸⁷ "Beiträge zu athenischer Politik und Publicistik des vierten Jahrhunderts, I., König Philippos und Isokrates", in *Nachrichten von der Kgl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, phil.-hist. Klasse, 1910, pp. 123-182.

⁸⁸ "Beiträge zu Athenischer Politik und Publicistik des vierten Jahrhunderts, II., Isokrates und Demosthenes", *loc. cit.*, 1910, pp. 289-323.

⁸⁹ P. Wendland, "Demosthenes im Unterricht des Gymnasiums", in *Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, III. (1913).

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-79.

Toward the end of 1917 E. Drerup, authority on Homer and Isocratean Letters, published a book with the title: *From the Days of an Ancient Lawyers'-Republic; Demosthenes and his Time*.⁹¹ The book has not come to my hand, but the London *Classical Review* prints an excerpt from the preface which is worth quoting:

But only through this mighty war, into which half the world was precipitated by the rancor and lies of Paris and London lawyer-politicians, has the mask been fully torn from the face of that chauvinistic demagogue [Demosthenes], who now appears to have been a worthy predecessor, and with the sympathetic views, of Asquith and Lloyd George, of Poincaré and Briand, of Venizelos and Jonescu, not to speak of the classic Land of Broken Faith. He who studies the orations of Demosthenes as contemporary documents in the light of the World War, who remains undeceived by their emotional appeal, and who measures the attainments of Demosthenes as politician and leader of the lawyers' party, and not according to Demosthenes' own self-righteous estimates, will soon discover him to be the master of the tuneful phrase, who knew, as Asquith, how to conceal his lack of fruitful political ideas and the unscrupulousness of his political methods.⁹²

The preceding quotations will, I venture to affirm, establish beyond reasonable doubt the conviction that the studies of even the foremost of German historians on the period of Greek history from 358 to 338 B.C. are in crying need of revision. Such a rewriting would dwell on the virtues as well as the vices of fourth-century Athenian democracy—its unrivalled training for citizenship, its increasingly anti-militaristic thought and action, its genuine enforcement of the principle of "open covenants, openly arrived at"; it would compromise less with the spirit of chauvinistic nationalism, the impulse of which is decidedly modern and certainly not Philippian; it would recognize in the aggressive tactics of Philip of Macedon the chief element disturbing to the peace of the Hellenic world; it would, on the basis of the scholarly linguistic researches of Hoffman, Pedrizet, Kretschmer, and others, suspend judgment on the problem of the racial affinities of Macedonians and Greeks; it would give Demosthenes due credit for his loyalty to the democratic ideal, for the generally defensive nature of his conflict with Philip, for his tenacious struggle to preserve the independent and continued existence of the city-state form of government, which alone had made possible Athenian cultural progress to his own day; it would never give credence to the view—designed to weaken documentary credibility—that Demosthenes's or-

⁹¹ E. Drerup, *Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik; Demosthenes und seine Zeit* (1917).

⁹² Cf. W. E. Pantin, in the *Classical Review*, XXXII. (1918) 122-123.

ations were mere political pamphlets, not delivered addresses; it would in all charity observe that Persia had ceased to be a great aggressive power which threatened to conquer the Hellenic peninsula, but was intent only on holding its own; and finally, it would interpret the orations of Isocrates from a philo-Athenian rather than a philo-Macedonian point of view, for that he was a good patriot, I am convinced.

Should I attempt to elaborate a coda for my recurring theme, it would be this: that, although the present generation of German historians have interpreted the story of the clash between Philip of Macedon and Demosthenes in the light of contemporary nationalistic and imperialistic thought, theirs was not the only sin against the Holy Ghost. The historical literature of even the greatest of our modern democracies—Great Britain, France, and the United States—has suffered somewhat from the taint of contemporaneous commercial and colonial imperialism. I would suggest a perusal, with this thought in mind, of the relevant sections of Cavaignac's recent *Histoire de l'Antiquité*, of Wheeler's *Alexander the Great*, and of Breasted's *Ancient Times*. Furthermore, the same decade of British imperial history (1895–1905) which witnessed the publication of Lecky's undemocratic volumes on *Democracy and Liberty* also received from the press the unsympathetic study of Hogarth on *Philip and Alexander of Macedon* and, for our period, the equally uncharitable *History of Greece* by Bury.

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